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Abstract: 
This paper analyses the effect of training participation on employees’ retention in the training 
company. It for the first time empirically combines the human capital and the monopsony 
theory by jointly controlling for the portability, visibility, and credibility of training. Based on an 
extensive German linked-employer-employee data set with detailed information on training 
history (WeLL-ADIAB), we show that training increases employees’ retention. We compare 
the probability to stay at the same employer between training participants and accidental 
training non-participants (those who could not participate in planned training on the basis of 
exogeneous reasons). Higher portability of general human capital contents and visibility of 
training induced by training certificates however reduce the retention effect of training. Reten-
tion is further reduced when training is credibly provided and certified by external institutions, 
the full training effect on retention is still positive, however. We are careful to control for en-
dogeneity of training participation in retention equations, unobserved time-invariant effects, 
and extensive individual and employer characteristics including wage increases and general 
job satisfaction.    
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1 Introduction 
The empirical literature on the effects of employee training mainly concentrates on wage and 
productivity increases (Dearden et al., 2000). A third effect – the retention of training partici-
pants at the training employer – has been analysed by few empirical papers only (Manning, 
2003; Brunello and De Paola, 2009). The possibility to retain trained workers is one of the 
key reasons for employer training investments, however (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a). It 
therefore might be a problem that training could even reduce retention if new skills are of 
value to other employers and training firms risk having their trained employees hired away 
(Black and Lynch, 1998). An empirical assessment of the retention effect of training therefore 
is an important piece of evidence for the explanation of employer investments in training that 
increase productivity elsewhere. When we look closer at the evidence on the retention effect 
of training, we see that most papers concentrate on the general employability of trained 
workers (Ridder, 1986; Card and Sullivan, 1988; Gritz, 1993; Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer, 
1996; Picchio and Van Ours, 2013) instead of the retention effect of training at the training 
firm.  
The few studies on the effects of training on employee retention are based on two comple-
mentary theories, the human capital theory and the monopsony theory (Manning, 2003; Leu-
ven, 2005). Human capital theory derives differences in the impact of training on employee 
retention based on the distinction between general and specific human capital in a perfect 
labour market (Becker, 1962). Training in general human capital should lead to a lower reten-
tion effect than specific human capital because general training is portable and also increas-
es productivity in other firms. Therefore the labour market value as well as the desirability of 
trained employees is higher (Stevens, 1994; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999; Zweimüller 
and Winter-Ebmer, 2003). The monopsony theory introduces a number of labour market fric-
tions that can explain why training firms pay trained employees a wage below their productiv-
ity without risking that they leave the firm (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a). Prominent exam-
ples of these market frictions are an information advantage of training firms on the ability of 
training participants (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Autor, 2001) or on training contents (Katz 
and Ziderman, 1990; Chang and Wang, 1996), a compressed wage structure (Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1999b; Dustmann and Schönberg, 2009), and mobility costs (Harhoff and Kane, 
1997; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a). One important hypothesis from the monopsony litera-
ture is that visible training should have a lower retention effect than unobservable training 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a; 2000; Katz and Ziderman, 1990). Information asymmetries 
on training contents therefore might render portable human capital into non-portable human 
capital (Becker, 1962, p.50-51; Barron et al., 1997b; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999, p.730). 
When we combine both theories, we find that firms are willing to invest in portable human 
capital in labour markets with information asymmetries because they can “hide” the abilities 
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of their best training participants (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a). Booth and Bryan (2005) 
for example argue that portable training in a labour market with frictions leads to wages lower 
than marginal productivity during and after training, which implies rents for the firm. As a 
consequence, retention of employees with portable training should be higher if training is not 
visible (or the certificates are not credible).  
Some empirical papers on the retention effect of training only observe training as a dummy 
variable and therefore cannot analyse differences in training contents and market frictions 
(see for example Brunello and De Paola, 2009). Other papers for example distinguish either 
between training portability or training visibility. They use this information to test the validity of 
the human capital theory or the monopsony theory. Although both theories are usually dis-
cussed in these empirical contributions, we do not find any empirical paper that jointly as-
sesses the retention effect of different kinds of human capital and labour market frictions 
such as information asymmetries.4 For example, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), Chang and 
Wang (1996) and Katz and Ziderman (1990) show that certification or visibility of training is a 
key determinant of the retention effect of training. These papers however do not empirically 
assess the validity of human capital theory on the retention effect of training. Loewenstein 
and Spletzer (1999) show that the retention effect of training is lower if training participants 
believe that training is also useful at other employers. They however do not control for labour 
market frictions and therefore do not assess monopsony theory. Lynch (1991) and Parent 
(1999) also only look at the retention effect of more or less portable training (measured by 
on-the-job versus off-the-job training). Benson et al. (2004) only analyse the effect of degrees 
obtained by training as signalling mechanism and an indicator of visibility of training on em-
ployee retention. 
This paper not only distinguishes between different kinds of human capital in training but at 
the same time controls for information asymmetries on the training content between training 
and other employers. It uses certifications for training measures as indicator for the visibility 
of training and the subjective assessment of the training participants on the usability of train-
ing contents at other employers as indicator for portability. In an additional step, it distin-
guishes between training provided and certified by external independent institutions or by the 
training establishment. It hereby argues that external providers give certificates a higher 
credibility (Katz and Ziderman, 1990). The joint empirical assessment of the human capital 
and the monopsony theory on the impact of training on employee retention allows us to  
answer a couple of interesting questions. We can assess whether one of both theories em-
pirically dominates the other, or in other words whether the explanatory power of one theory 
                                               
4 One of the few papers that jointly assess portability and visibility of training is Booth and Bryan 
(2005). It shows that employer-financed training (that is interpreted as portable training) only has posi-
tive wage effects at the current employer. A positive wage effect is also found after a job change if 
training is accredited (leading to qualifications) but not when it is non-accredited. 
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vanishes after controlling for the other theory. It may be the case, for example that the porta-
bility of training is less important in comparison to the visibility of training because training 
participation per se already is an indicator for ability irrespective of the training contents. It 
might also be the case however that both training characteristics are orthogonal in their effect 
on retention and therefore do not influence the impact of each other.  
We are careful to control for the usual sources of estimation bias when assessing the effects 
of training. One of the central empirical problems is endogenous selection into training (Card, 
1999; Heckman, 1999). In order to overcome this problem, we use the approach proposed 
by Leuven and Oosterbeck (2008): instead of comparing training participants with all training 
non-participants, we use as comparison group only those employees who had been selected 
to participate in training but had to cancel their participation on the basis of exogenous rea-
sons. If training participants and accidental training non-participants differ with respect to 
relevant unobservable characteristics although their employer chose or accepted both 
groups for training, the training coefficients in the OLS retention equation are still biased. 
Time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity affecting retention and training such as ability or 
motivation are therefore in addition controlled for by applying individual fixed effects estima-
tion. Time-varying unobserved characteristics such as career prospects are controlled for in 
Diff-GMM estimations. We compare the results from between, within and GMM (instrumen-
tal) estimates and rigorously test the applicability of the different specifications. 
Training frequently is accompanied by wage changes – training employers want to increase 
employee retention by increasing wages and sharing rents (Becker, 1962; Hashimoto, 1981). 
These wage increases after training might be a key factor for the retention effect of training 
(Benson et al., 2004; Grund and Sliwka, 2001). Nevertheless, most of the empirical retention 
studies have not taken wage changes after training into account. Besides Benson et al. 
(2004) this is therefore the first training retention analysis that includes wages changes. An-
other important yet usually unobserved individual characteristic that may bias the results is 
general job satisfaction (Brunello and De Paola, 2009). Our data set also allows us to control 
for this information. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the 
data set, the estimation strategy and the variables. The sample characteristics are shown in 
Section 4. We present and interpret the results of the estimations and robustness checks in 
section 5. The paper ends with a conclusion in section 6.   
 
2 Theoretical framework  
According to Becker’s traditional human capital approach, skills can be considered as ena-
blers of individual and firm-level productivity and we should distinguish between general and 
firm-specific skills. Whereas training with general contents increases the productivity of train-
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ees equally in all establishments, training measures imparting specific human capital en-
hances employees’ productivity exclusively in the training establishment (Becker, 1962). As a 
consequence, after general training in competitive labour markets, training firms run the risk 
of having their trained employees poached5 away (Bishop, 1997; Black and Lynch, 1998; 
Mohrenweiser et al., 2013). This threat is greatly lower if trained skills are not portable to 
other firms. Our first hypothesis therefore is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When the training content is general and therefore portable to outside 
employers, the retention effect of training is lower. 
 
According to the theories based on labour market frictions, the retention probability depends 
on the visibility of training contents (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a; Chang and Wang, 1996). 
In practice, the current employer usually has information advantages concerning the exact 
content (for example focus and type) and the amount of the training. Training measures often 
are informal, heterogenous, and tailored to the needs of the training participants (Katz and 
Ziderman, 1990) and therefore hard to assess for outside firms. Based on this information 
asymmetry, for outside establishments it is hardly possible to completely observe the con-
tents of training. Since outside establishments are unable to judge the quantity and quality of 
training, they won’t be willing to fully compensate the trained employees for these skills. 
Thus, they pay a wage below the real productivity of the trained employees (Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1998; 1999a; Katz and Ziderman, 1990). The training establishment with an infor-
mation advantage should therefore be able to match the outside wage offer for trained em-
ployees it would like to retain. However, often training measures end with the award of a cer-
tificate, a degree or an accreditation (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2000; Booth and Bryan, 2005). 
By means of certificates, trained employees are able to proof their efforts in the training 
measure, the training contents, and therefore their acquired skills also outside the training 
establishment. This reduces the information asymmetry (Arcidiacono et al., 2010) and im-
proves the labour market chances of trained employees. Therefore, we assume:  
 
Hypothesis 2: When training content can be signalled by means of a certificate and 
therefore is visible, the retention effect of training is lower. 
 
In addition to the visibility of training contents, also the credibility of certificates might play an 
important role. Considering various types of training certificates, trained employees rather 
                                               
5 If a company poaches away employees from a training firm, then training investments are irretrieva-
bly lost. However, the poaching establishment enhances their firms’ human capital without paying 
anything for training (Mohrenweiser et al., 2013). 
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prefer an independent system of certification, which leads to a higher credibility of the train-
ing contents and, thereby, further improves their outside options (Katz and Ziderman, 1990). 
Often training measures are certified by external independent institutions such as chambers 
of commerce or chambers of crafts (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2000). Thus, we predict:    
 
Hypothesis 3: When training content can be signalled by means of an external certifi-
cate, the retention effect of training is additionally reduced.  
 
When assessing the relative importance of the human capital and monopsony theory for the 
retention effect of training, it is crucial to investigate whether general training contents are 
certified more often than rather specific training contents. For example, the explanatory pow-
er of portable training courses on retention might vanish if we additionally control for visibility 
of training courses. It might however also be the case that visibility and portability have an 
orthogonal effect on retention and therefore do not influence each other. One possible hy-
pothesis therefore is: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The measured effect of visibility and portability on retention respectively 
decreases, if we include the other dimension of training characteristics in the retention 
equation. 
 
3 Data and estimation strategy  
In order to analyse the retention effect of different training measures and to test our hypothe-
ses, we use the German linked employer-employee dataset WeLL-ADIAB6. The dataset was 
developed within the project “Further Training as a Part of Lifelong Learning (WeLL)” with the 
purpose to gain a better understanding regarding “(…) the determinants and consequences 
of further training in Germany” (Bender et al., 2009, p. 638). In the project, 149 establish-
ments were selected from the 2005 wave of the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) Es-
tablishment Panel7. From these establishments, between the years 2007 and 2010 randomly 
                                               
6 WeLL-ADIAB is the abbreviation for “WeLL survey data linked to administrative data on the IAB” 
(Schmucker et al., 2014). 
7 Only establishments with between 50 and 1,999 employees subject to social security contributions, 
establishments from manufacturing or the service industry and locations in the German federal states 
Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and 
Saxony were selected. By stratification of the selection criteria, 12 employer groups were formed, from 
which in each case the five firms with the highest and the five firms with the lowest overall investment 
expenditures were asked to participate in the WeLL project. The selection criteria have been chosen in 
order to guarantee that the results are not driven by specific training patterns correlated with the num-
bers of employees, branches or regions (Bender et al., 2008b). 
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7.352 selected employees were asked in four annual waves8 about their individual training 
behaviour and specific training measures during the last year(s). Only employees with jobs 
covered by social security contributions as well as individuals in minor employment were in-
cluded in the sample selection. This excludes apprentices, people in internships and em-
ployees in partial retirement. The survey includes inter alia, details on the start and the end 
date, the duration as well as the thematic focus of their training measures. Furthermore, 
training participants were asked whether they received a specific training certificate, whether 
the training contents were portable to outside establishments, and offered and certified by 
external institutions (Bender et al., 2008b).  
An important benefit of the data set is the linkage of the individual training information with 
administrative and survey data provided by the IAB in Nuremberg. Based on the Integrated 
Employment Biographies, the complete individual employment history is available. This histo-
ry includes the start and end dates of employment periods, the exact daily wage in the re-
spective periods, and further characteristics of employment (e.g. occupation, job status, 
working time), and unemployment spells. Besides workplace characteristics, the data set 
also comprises socio-demographic information such as age, sex, educational and vocational 
qualifications (Schmucker et al., 2014). The individual information of the employees can be 
linked to establishment-level information (e.g. establishment size, sector, location, wage lev-
el, and qualification structure), from the IAB Establishment Panel (Bender et al., 2008a; 
Spengler, 2007). Employment history and wage information have been collected for social 
insurance reasons by administrative institutions and therefore are highly reliable (Bender et 
al., 2009).   
Given that the selection of establishments did not occur randomly, the WeLL-ADIAB dataset 
cannot claim to be representative for the population of German establishments (Knerr et al. 
2012). Despite this limitation, the employer-employee panel structure of the data set as well 
as the wide range of topics relating to training is unique for Germany. Furthermore, the basic 
employee sample (approx. 56,000 employees) was defined as the whole workforce of the 
149 establishments and, therefore, the employee sample can be seen as representative 
(Bender et al. 2008a).  
For our analysis, we use the longitudinal version of the WeLL-ADIAB data set between 2006 
and 2010. Our sample comprises 5,9419 training participants and accidental training non-
participants from 149 establishments. Furthermore, note that 1,755 training non-participants 
                                               
8 The first wave contains the complete training information for the years 2006 and 2007, the second 
wave the training information for the year 2008, the third wave for 2009, and the fourth wave for 2010.  
9 In order to obtain comparable and convincing results, based on the sample selection of the WeLL-
ADIAB data set (7.352 employees), we additionally eliminate individuals in part-time employment 
(1.411 employees). 
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have been excluded in order to obtain a homogeneous comparison group according to the 
Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008) approach.  
 
Dependent variable 
Brunello and De Paola (2003), Card and Sullivan (1988), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999), 
and Picchio and Van Ours (2013) measure the effect of training on employee retention as the 
probability to stay in employment in the next period of time. In this paper, we adopt their ap-
proach but focus on the future employment in the same establishment. Therefore, our de-
pendent binary variable 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 takes the value of 1 if the individual i is still employed in the 
current establishment j in the next calendar year (t+1). If the individual changes the employer 
or is unemployed, the variable is 0.  
In the WeLL-ADIAB data set, there are individuals with several employment spells per year 
measured on a day-to-day basis. These spells might be in the same establishment or in vari-
ous establishments. In order to calculate the employees’ retention in the period from 2006 
until 2010, we define the employer at the first of January as reference point for training during 
the previous year. In the same manner, we accumulate further employment characteristics 
(e.g. working time, job status) and assign them to each employment spell. Finally, by com-
paring the establishment identifier in the current year and on January 1st in the next year, we 
determine whether an individual was still employed in the same establishment in the next 
calendar year10.  
 
Training information  
In each annual wave, the respondents were asked about the last three training measures in 
chronological order. If the respondents stated more training measures than requested, we 
delete this additional information, to ensure consistency. We also delete all training 
measures that have no detailed information concerning their start and end dates. Hence, we 
are able to assign every single training measure to the appropriate employment spell. For our 
research question it is of importance that we know which employer offered the training 
measure. Therefore, we eliminate all training measures that could not be clearly assigned to 
an employer and that have not been finished one month before the potential job change be-
cause the training information is given on a monthly basis. According to this procedure, the 
explanatory binary training variable 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 takes the value 1 if an individual participates in train-
                                               
10 The calculation of the employees’ retention on a daily basis is very accurate. The binary variable 
takes only the value of 1, if an individual was employed in the same establishment exactly 365 days 
after the reference point. A calculation on a yearly basis would be less exact and would often imply to 
measure an employee’s retention, although the employee had already left the establishment a few 
months before. 
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ing offered by the training establishment j in the current calendar year t, otherwise the varia-
ble takes the value zero. 
Barron et al. (1997a) and Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) note that training definitions differ 
between firms and that training information provided by the employer therefore is unreliable. 
They propose to use the assessment by training participants as comparable and reliable in-
formation on the portability. We therefore also rely on the subjective assessment of the train-
ing participants whether their training contents can be used in other firms.11  
Besides the portability of training, we also control for the visibility of training. A certificate at 
the end of the training course might be viewed as a means of conveying to the outside labour 
market the contents and value of the training as well as employee ability (Booth and Bryan, 
2005).  
Credibility of training is measured by the fact that the training was provided and the certificate 
was issued by a third party and not the training employer itself. The training employer might 
use the certificate in order to disguise the true training contents. Either it may hide general 
contents in order to reduce the market value of employees it would like to retain or it may 
exaggerate training contents attractive for other employers in order to improve labour market 
chances of employees it would like to get rid of. External institutions might not strategically 
manipulate the certification of training contents. 
 
Control variables 
Besides information on the training participation, a couple of further individual and establish-
ment level characteristics may have an impact on the probability to retain employees in the 
training company and on training participation.  
Training frequently is accompanied or followed by wage increases and these wage increases 
might have a decisive impact on the decision to stay at the training employer (Parent, 2003; 
Chéron et al., 2010). In contrast to previous studies, in which individual wages are observed 
only at one point in time (Gritz, 1993; Lynch, 1991; Parent, 2003), respectively at the begin-
ning and at the end of the observation period (Benson et al, 2004), we consider individual 
wage changes on an annual basis.12 To control for general wage increases in the establish-
ment, for example due to inflation or collective bargaining contracts (Weller, 2007), we define 
an individual wage increase as an individual wage change that exceeds the average estab-
lishment-wide wage increase in the respective occupational peer group. According to this 
                                               
11 The exact wording of the question is: “How easily can the obtained knowledge also be used at an-
other employer according to your opinion“ (“Inwieweit ließen sich nach Ihrer Einschätzung die er-
worbenen Kenntnisse auch in einem anderen Betrieb verwenden)“. 
12 In other studies on the effects of training, wages cannot be taken into account at all because they 
are not included in the data records (Card and Sullivan, 1988; Elias, 1994; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 
1999; Picchio and Van Ours, 2013; Veum, 1997; Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer, 2003).  
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definition, our binary wage increase variable takes the value of 1, if the wage increase of 
individual i is higher than the average wage increase of individuals in the same occupation in 
the establishment j in the current calendar year t. In our data structure, wages may differ  
between several employment spells in one establishment and year. For the calculation of the 
individual wage increase, we therefore use the weighted daily wage13 of the employees by 
establishment and year. In the case of unemployment spells, the daily wage is set to zero.  
Another factor that might influence training and retention and capture additional dimensions 
of otherwise unobservable individual characteristics is job satisfaction (Brunello and De Pao-
la, 2009). We therefore control for general job satisfaction that is individual assessed and 
changes from year to year in our data set (Zwick, 2015). 
Further individual characteristics that might influence the retention probability of employees 
are gender, age, and schooling level (Göggel and Zwick, 2012). Qualification might be posi-
tively related to training and retention (Gritz, 1993). We know that older employees and those 
employees with higher tenure and experience are less willing to change employers. In addi-
tion, training participation decreases with age, tenure, and experience (Picchio and Van 
Ours, 2013; Zwick, 2015). As an indicator for the previous employment history, we consider 
the years of employment in the same establishment (tenure) and the professional experience 
(Parent, 1999; Benson et al., 2004). We capture age as cohort effects, i.e. as groups of birth 
years because it is closely related to experience for our employees who have few and short 
unemployment spells. 
Since the establishment training propensity might influence the employment prospects and 
the retention probability of the employees (Wagner and Zwick, 2012), we additionally take 
establishment size, sector, and the location of the establishment into account (Loewenstein 
and Spletzer, 1999). 
 
Estimation strategy 
Our main contribution to the literature is the analysis of the impact of portability, visibility, and 
credibility on the retention effect of training. In order to do this, we expand the training  
participation dummy by indicators of whether training is of general content, whether training 
was completed with a certificate or not and whether the certificate was issued by an external 
provider or not. 
                                               
13 In order to obtain the weighted daily wage, first daily wage is multiplied with the number of days in 
the corresponding employment spell and divided by the overall duration of all employment spells by 
employer and year. Although it is not possible to assign the annual wage increase exactly to the start 
and end date of training, we are able to take into account changes in daily wages as a consequence of 
an employer change during the year.  
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In estimations of the impact of training participation on the employees’ retention in the train-
ing establishment, a couple of estimation problems may occur, which might lead to biased 
estimators and results. First, it is important to adopt a “before-and-after” approach, i.e. train-
ing in period t is related to employment in period t+1. This avoids reverse causality (Dearden 
et al., 1997). We therefore always use training participation as determinant of retention in the 
training firm in the next calendar year. 
Besides the timing of events, we have to take into account that the selection of employees 
into training usually is not random, or in other words third factors have an influence on train-
ing participation in t and retention in t+1 (Card, 1999; Heckman, 1999). There are several 
solutions to the endogeneity problem and we show how our results differ if we apply these 
solutions in turn. One solution to reduce the potential of unobserved third factors to influence 
the coefficients is proposed by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008). They compare training  
participants only with those employees who were selected to participate in training but could 
not participate on the basis of exogenous reasons. In the WeLL data, the question to identify 
accidental training non-participants is: “Did you intend to participate in training courses, sem-
inars or lectures in the last two years without realizing this plan?”. It is crucial that the rea-
sons for non-participation are random because otherwise selection bias could contaminate 
the results (Görlitz, 2011). Employees cancelling a course because of high training costs are 
probably not comparable to training participants, for example. Therefore, we have a closer 
look at the reasons of training cancellation. We regard the following reasons as random: the 
course was cancelled by the training organiser or an unexpected job had priority14. We use 
the reduced sample of training and accidental training non-participants in all main tables of 
the paper and compare the results obtained with the full sample in a robustness check. 
In our first estimation of the retention effect of training, we use the training information 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 in 
an ordinary least squares estimation. In addition, we include our wage increase dummy, work 
satisfaction, birth year, tenure, experience, gender, and qualification in an individual infor-
mation vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡. Finally, we also include an establishment characteristics vector 𝑌𝑗𝑡 with 
employer size and sector, and year dummies t. The variance in our cross section specifica-
tion comes from differences in training participation between employees and the regression 
can be written like this (with ε being an idiosyncratic error term): 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽´𝑋𝑖𝑡1 + 𝛾´𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
                                               
14 There is some debate whether family or health reasons also can be regarded as random cancella-
tion reasons (Görlitz, 2011). The main argument is that employees with long-lasting health problems 
or for example employees with young children or care duties for elderly parents might routinely have to 
cancel training participation. Very few employees indicated that these were the reasons for training 
non-participation and therefore we drop these cases from our sample. If we also include these cases 
into the group of training non-participants, our results are unchanged, however. 
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It might be the case however that training participants and accidental training non-
participants nevertheless differ in time-variant or time-invariant characteristics related to both, 
training participation and retention. We therefore estimate all variables in time differences. 
Our fixed effects model eliminates all time-fixed individual unobserved heterogeneity and can 
be written as (with Δ as indicator for differences from year to year and 𝑋𝑖𝑡2 a smaller vector 
of the time-varying individual characteristics work satisfaction, tenure, experience):  
 
∆𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝑐 + 𝛼∆𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽´∆𝑋𝑖𝑡2 + 𝛾´∆𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (2) 
 
Even if we reduce the sample to training and accidental training non-participants and control 
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, unobserved time-variant factors such as future 
employment expectations at the training firm or the chance of the employee to get a promo-
tion may have an impact on training participation and current retention. Therefore, in our third 
and preferred estimation approach, we use the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator (Diff 
GMM)15 (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2006). In the Diff GMM estimation, the lagged 
levels (internal instruments) of the endogenous explanatory variables are added to the fixed 
effects estimation. By doing so, the endogenous variables are pre-determined and not corre-
lated anymore with the error term in the initial estimation equation (Roodman, 2006).  
Some authors propose to use exogenous instruments. However, the usage of exogenous 
instruments16 reduces our sample size substantially17. In addition, many papers on the ef-
fects of training argue that it is very hard to come up with a convincing instrument (Dearden 
et al. 1997; Leuven, 2005). We therefore show the results of the Diff GMM estimation with an 
exogenous instrument in a robustness check only.  
 
 
                                               
15 More precisely, we use the one-step Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator, which is not robust 
to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. We therefore test for autocorrelation and use 
heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. Furthermore, we apply the small-sample adjustment 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991).    
16 We use establishments´ expectations of skill shortages as exogenous instrument. If establishments 
expect skill shortages, this should lead to more training in the establishment and therefore to a higher 
individual training probability. However, expected skill shortages should not affect the individual reten-
tion probability. Therefore, this instrument is assumed to be exogenous.   
17 In addition to the differenced equation in the Diff GMM estimation, the system GMM estimator uses 
the level equation to obtain a system of two equations. As the variables in levels in the second equa-
tion are instrumented with their own first differences, additional instruments can be obtained (Blundell 
& Bond, 1998). However, this reduces the sample size by one observation per individual. Furthermore, 
it is not appropriate to use a system GMM estimation with a comparably small dataset as is the case in 
the current paper. 
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4 Findings 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 shows descriptive sample characteristics separately for training participants and ac-
cidental training non-participants.  
 
Table 1: Description of differences between training participants and accidental training non-
participants 
Socio-demographic  
Factors 
Total 
Training  
participants 
Accidental  
training non-
participants 
t-value 
Female  29.55% 29.47% 30.04% 0.43 
  
   
 
Birth year  
   
 
≤ 1951 9.98% 10.51% 6.70% -4.35*** 
1952-61 35.14% 35.73% 31.44% -3.08*** 
1962-71 32.06% 31.94% 32.84% 0.66 
≥ 1972 22.81% 21.83% 29.01% 5.87*** 
  
   
 
Experience  
   
 
< 10 years 20.88% 19.70% 28.28% 7.24*** 
10 – 20 years 49.86% 50.46% 46.10% 2.99*** 
> 20 years  29.26% 29.84% 25.63% 3.17*** 
  
   
 
Tenure 
   
 
< 10 years 45.42% 44.19% 53.17% 6.18*** 
10 – 20 years 37.75% 38.79% 31.22% -5.35*** 
> 20 years  16.83% 17.02% 15.61% -1.29 
  
   
 
Education 
   
 
No vocational education 3.72% 3.54% 4.91% 2.42** 
Vocational education 68.67% 69.00% 66.51% -1.78* 
University degree 27.63% 27.47% 28.58% 0.83 
  
   
 
Work satisfaction 82.81% 84.14% 74.45% -8.83*** 
     
Wage increase dummy 35.57% 35.97% 32.91% -2.11** 
Log daily wage 2005 4.61 4.61 4.58 -1.34 
Log daily wage 2006 4.65 4.67 4.60 -2.28** 
Log daily wage 2007 4.64 4.67 4.49 -5.24*** 
Log daily wage 2008 4.65 4.68 4.41 -6.08*** 
     
Training  
 
- -  
Training certificate 75.22% - -  
External certificate 84.31% - -  
Training with general content 82.68% - -  
      
Observations 9,925 8,599 1,326  
 
The majority of the respondents is male and is born between 1952 and 1971. Whereas most 
of the survey participants (79.12%) have at least a professional experience of 10 years, only 
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54.63% have worked with the same establishment for more than 10 years. Regarding the 
educational background, 3.72% have no vocational education, 68.67% completed vocational 
education, and 27.63% hold a university degree. Furthermore, 35.57% of the respondents 
receive a higher wage increase than their occupational peer group in the establishment. In 
75.22% of the training measures, the employees receive training certificates, which are fre-
quently provided by external institutions (84.31%). Furthermore, there are more training 
measures with general and therefore portable training contents according to the training par-
ticipants (82.68%).  
We use the approach of Leuven and Oosterbeck (2008) and therefore reduce the problem 
that training participants have been selected by unobserved third factors that may be rele-
vant for retention. As a consequence, unobservable as well as observable characteristics of 
training participants and accidental training non-participants should be more similar than of 
training participants and all training non-participants in the original sample. In Table 1, we 
see socio-demographic differences between participants and accidental training non-
participants in age, in professional experience, tenure, and in work satisfaction. There are no 
gender differences and differences in the educational background of both groups. In the con-
text of unobservable characteristics, especially the educational background is very important 
because it is closely linked to factors such as motivation and innate ability (Görlitz, 2011). 
According to Pischke (2001), differences in unobservable characteristics between training 
participants and training non-participants also should be reflected by past wage differen-
tials.18 Whereas the log daily wage of training participants and accidental training non-
participants differs significantly for the years in the observation period, we cannot find signifi-
cant differences for the year 2005, prior to our observation period where both groups might 
not have participated in training.  
In order to test whether our reduced sample of accidental training non-participants is better 
comparable to training participants than all training non-participants, we also present the de-
scriptive statistics of the full sample in Table A1 in the appendix. Indeed, accidental training 
non-participants are more similar to training participants than all training non-participants. 
More specifically, training participants have significantly higher daily wages than all training 
non-participants not only in the observation period, but also in the year 2005 (Table A1, t = -
7.98***). Thus, both groups already differ significantly in the full sample in the period before 
they were asked about their individual training behavior. Furthermore, training participants 
are also significantly higher educated compared to all training non-participants (Table A1). 
When we replicate the impact of training on wage analysis for the small and the full sample, 
we obtain the same results as Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008) and Görlitz (2011): the impact 
                                               
18 By means of the linkage with administrative data, the WeLL-ADIAB data set also contains wage 
information previous to the reference period of the training questions for both groups.  
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of training participation on wages in the following year is much smaller (3.4%) when training 
participants are compared to accidental training non-participants than in the full sample 
(9.8%), compare Table A2. 
 
Retention effect of training 
In the multivariate analyses, first we test whether training increases the employees’ retention 
when we additionally control for important individual and employer characteristics. Table 2 
shows the regression output for the different estimation methods ordinary least squares, 
fixed effects, and diff GMM. 
 
Table 2: Determinants of employee retention I 
Dependent variable:  
retention next year 
Model with training dummy 
OLS (1) FE (2) GMM (3) 
training 
0.080*** 
(0.007) 
0.089*** 
(0.011) 
0.113*** 
(0.024) 
wage increase 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
female 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
- - 
birth year 1952-1961 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
- - 
birth year 1962-1971 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
- - 
birth year > 1972 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
- - 
tenure < 10 
-0.041*** 
(0.009) 
0.088*** 
(0.032) 
0.176* 
(0.104) 
tenure 10-20 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.036 
(0.031) 
0.008 
(0.085) 
experience < 10 
-0.029** 
(0.011) 
-0.019 
(0.035) 
-0.057 
(0.065) 
experience 10-20 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.039) 
work satisfaction 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
vocational education 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
- - 
university degree 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
- - 
year dummies yes yes yes 
establishment characteristics yes yes yes 
R² 0.068 0.038 - 
observations 8,086 8,086 3,281 
individuals - 4,186 2,071 
AR-test  - - 0.824 
Hansen-test - - 0.304 
Dependent variable: retention probability in the next calendar year; reference category for age: birth year ≤ 1951; 
reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20; reference catego-
ry for education: no vocational education; establishment characteristics: size, sector; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p 
< 0.1; Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006-2010. 
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The OLS estimation suggests that training participation increases the retention probability in 
the training establishment in the next calendar year on average by 8%. Controlling additional-
ly for time-fixed individual unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity, we find a retention 
effect of 8.9% in the Fixed Effects and of 11.3% in the Diff GMM estimation. According to this 
finding, it seems that the first two models underestimate the retention effect of training prob-
ably due to measurement errors. A positive retention effect of training is in accordance with 
the findings in Dearden et al. (1997) and Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998). Brunello and De 
Paola (2009) however do not find a training effect on retention. When focusing on our pre-
ferred model – the Diff GMM estimation in model 3 – we find a higher retention probability of 
3.6% for individuals with a wage increase above the occupational peer group. Furthermore, 
we see that individuals with shorter job tenure have a higher probability to be retained (also 
compare Benson et al., 2004). In contrast, there is a higher retention rate for individuals with 
more professional experience (however, this effect is not significant). The OLS estimation in 
addition indicates that there are hardly any gender differences in the retention rate and older 
employees have a higher probability to stay in the current establishment (model 1) (also 
compare Brunello and De Paola, 2009). Furthermore, in this estimation model individuals 
have a significantly higher retention probability, when they are satisfied with the present 
working conditions. The AR-test in the Diff GMM estimation indicates that there is no auto-
correlation in levels. Since the Hansen-test is insignificant (p=0.304), we conclude that the 
internal instruments are valid. 
Once we know that training generally increases the employees’ retention in the current es-
tablishment, in the next step we investigate whether the retention effect is influenced by port-
ability and visibility of training measures (Table 3). When the training content is portable to 
outside establishments, this significantly reduces the retention probability by 1.9% both in the 
OLS and in the Fixed Effects Model. Also Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999) find a significantly 
lower retention effects for training that is general and portable (e.g. schooling) in comparison 
to rather specific measures such as company training.19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
19 Assuming that off-the-job training is rather general, Lynch (1991) and Parent (1999) find that these 
measures have a stronger negative retention effect than on-the-job training. Dearden et al (1997) find 
a higher negative retention effect of training for employee-funded than for employer-funded training. 
We also find an additional positive retention effect for training at the workplace and for employer-
funded training, when focusing on these measures. Veum (1997) however does not find a retention 
effect of training. 
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Table 3: Determinants of employee retention II 
Dependent variable: 
retention next year 
Model with general content 
 
Model with training certificate 
OLS (1) FE (2) GMM (3) 
 
OLS (4) FE (5) GMM (6) 
training 
0.097*** 
(0.009) 
0.106*** 
(0.015) 
0.130*** 
(0.027)  
0.092*** 
(0.008) 
0.105*** 
(0.013) 
0.128*** 
(0.027) 
wage increase 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.036*** 
(0.012)  
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
training * general 
content 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
-0.018 
(0.015)  
- - - 
training * certificate - - - 
 
-0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.020** 
(0.010) 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
female 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
- - 
 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
- - 
birthyear 1952-1961 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
- - 
 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
- - 
birthyear 1962-1971 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
- - 
 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
- - 
birthyear > 1972 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
- - 
 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
- - 
tenure < 10 
-0.041*** 
(0.009) 
0.090*** 
(0.032) 
0.178* 
(0.104)  
-0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.089*** 
(0.032) 
0.176* 
(0.104) 
tenure 10-20 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.037 
(0.031) 
0.009 
(0.086)  
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.037 
(0.031) 
0.008 
(0.086) 
experience < 10 
-0.029*** 
(0.011) 
-0.020 
(0.035) 
-0.057 
(0.065)  
-0.028** 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
-0.057 
(0.065) 
experience 10-20 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.039)  
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.026) 
0.006 
(0.039) 
work satisfaction 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.008)  
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
vocational education 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
- - 
 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
- - 
university degree 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
- - 
 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
- - 
year dummies yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
establishment charac-
teristics 
yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
R² 0.069 0.038 - 
 
0.069 0.039 - 
observations 8,086 8,086 3,281 
 
8,086 8,086 3,281 
individuals - 4,186 2,071 
 
- 4,186 2,071 
AR-test  - - 0.770 
 
- - 0.809 
Hansen test - - 0.311 
 
- - 0.296 
Dependent variable: retention probability in the next calendar year; reference category for age: birth year ≤ 1951; 
reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20; reference catego-
ry for education: no vocational education; establishment characteristics: size, sector; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p 
< 0.1; Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006-2010. 
 
We also find negative retention effects in the case of visible training measures (Models 4 – 
6). This finding is in accordance with Benson et al (2004) who find that training participants 
with a degree after training are more likely to quit than without a degree. Dearden et al. 
(1997) also find a stronger effect of training with qualification than for training without qualifi-
cation. These interaction effects are of the same magnitude as those of portable training. 
Again they are however not significant in the Diff GMM estimation. The retention effects of 
the other control variables in the different model specifications are robust to the addition of 
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the interaction terms. Furthermore, in Model 3 as well as in Model 6, the AR-tests and the 
Hansen-tests indicate that there is no autocorrelation in levels and the instruments are valid. 
We therefore find weak support for our first two hypotheses. 
In order to check whether training with general human capital content and training with certif-
icates are not exactly the same measures, in the next step we simultaneously consider both 
interactions in one model (Table 4, Models 1 – 3). The coefficients are comparable to the 
estimation models with separate controls, they however lose significance. Again the AR-test 
and the Hansen-test indicate that there is no autocorrelation in levels and that the instru-
ments are valid. Again in all models, the retention effect of the other control variables is prac-
tically unchanged in comparison to the previous estimations. Based on these results, we see 
that visibility or portability do not dominate the negative retention effect measured separately. 
In contrast, both training characteristics seem to have a separate impact on retention and are 
therefore orthogonal. Furthermore, we can see that training measures with rather specific 
and therefore not portable contents are certified at least as often as general training 
measures (compare Table A3). The same applies for externally provided training measures, 
where the share of certification is even higher for both kinds of training contents (see Table 
A4). Our fourth hypothesis is therefore not supported.  
According to our hypothesis three, the negative retention effects of general and certified 
training measures are stronger, when we focus exclusively on training measures provided 
and certified by external independent institutions (Model 4 – 6). When individuals participate 
in externally provided training measures with general content, this reduces the retention 
probability by 4.0%. Furthermore, we find a large negative retention effect (3.6%) for training 
measures that are certified by external institutions. Again, visibility and portability have a dis-
tinct impact on retention and the other covariates hardly change when compared to the other 
estimation models. The AR-test in the Diff GMM model indicates that there is no autocorrela-
tion in levels. Probably due to the reduced number of observations in this specification the 
Hansen-test is significant on the ten percent level only. We conclude that training certificates 
from external providers can be considered as powerful signals for training participants´ ability 
and the portability of training. In consequence, employees participating in portable and visible 
measures are able to credibly prove their acquired skills to potential new employers. Individ-
ual career and earning prospects can be improved and employees have higher incentives to 
leave the current establishment. 
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Table 4: Determinants of employee retention III 
dep. variable:  
retention next year 
Model with general content  
and certificate  
Model with general content and certif-
icate (externally provided) 
OLS (1) FE (2) GMM (3) 
 
OLS (4) FE (5) GMM (6) 
training 
0.105*** 
(0.010) 
0.119*** 
(0.016) 
0.141*** 
(0.030)  
0.121*** 
(0.016) 
0.149*** 
(0.026) 
0.179*** 
(0.038) 
wage increase 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.036*** 
(0.012)  
0.040*** 
(0.007) 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.014) 
training * general  
content 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.016 
(0.014)  
-0.030** 
(0.012) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.040** 
(0.019) 
training * certificate 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
-0.017 
(0.015)  
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
-0.041** 
(0.016) 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
female 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
- - 
 
0.002 
(0.008) 
- - 
birth year 1952-1961 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
- - 
 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
- - 
birth year 1962-1971 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
- - 
 
-0.020* 
(0.012) 
- - 
birth year > 1972 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
- - 
 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
- - 
tenure < 10 
-0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.091*** 
(0.032) 
0.177* 
(0.104)  
-0.041*** 
(0.013) 
0.082* 
(0.046) 
0.057 
(0.100) 
tenure 10-20 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.038 
(0.031) 
0.008 
(0.086)  
-0.012 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.043) 
-0.068 
(0.084) 
experience < 10 
-0.029** 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
-0.057 
(0.065)  
-0.033** 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.050) 
-0.027 
(0.075) 
experience 10-20 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.039)  
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.037) 
0.001 
(0.048) 
work satisfaction 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.008)  
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
vocational education 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
- - 
 
0.016 
(0.018) 
- - 
university degree 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
- - 
 
0.018 
(0.019) 
- - 
year dummies  yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
establishment charac-
teristics  
yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
R² 0.069 0.039 - 
 
0.090 0.054 - 
observations 8,086 8,086 3,281 
 
4,682 4,682 1,915 
individuals - 4,186 2,071 
 
- 2,626 1,312 
AR-test  - - 0.763 
 
- - 0.352 
Hansen test - - 0.303 
 
- - 0.075 
Dependent variable: retention probability in the next calendar year; reference category for age: birth year ≤ 1951; 
reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20; reference catego-
ry for education: no vocational education; establishment characteristics: size, sector; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p 
< 0.1; Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006-2010. 
 
Robustness checks 
In order to ensure that our results are not distorted by estimation problems or the sample 
selection, we run a series of robustness checks. First, as the dependent retention variable is 
a binary variable, for the model specifications in Table 4, we additionally calculate marginal 
effects in a Linear Probability Model (Table A5). The results in model 1 suggest that training 
 20 
 
increases the probability to retain the employee in the training establishment by 12.8%. 
However, this positive effect is reduced by 1.2% when training contents are general and by 
1.4% when trained employees are able to make the contents visible to outside establish-
ments by means of a certificate. Again, these negative effects are stronger, when we focus 
exclusively on externally provided training measures. When individuals participate in external 
provided training with general content, this reduces the retention rate even by 3.3%. Fur-
thermore, when training participants receive certificates from an external independent institu-
tion, this reduces the retention probability by 2.0%. Thus, the marginal effects in the Linear 
Probability Model are comparable to the results obtained in the OLS, the Fixed Effects, and 
the Diff GMM Model in Table 4. This also applies to the retention effects of the other covari-
ates.  
In the context of the different estimation strategies, we already discussed the possibility to 
use an exogenous instrument in the Diff GMM estimation as a further robustness check. In 
this paper, we therefore use establishments´ expectations of skill shortages as exogenous 
instrument. As already mentioned, expected skill shortages should lead to more training in 
the establishment but shouldn’t affect the individual retention probability. Therefore this in-
strument is assumed to be exogenous. However, the required establishment information for 
the exogenous instrument substantially reduces the number of observations in the estimation 
regressions. For that reason, in the basic model of Table A6 the additional negative effects of 
general (-0.1%) and certified (-0.7%) training measures are rather small and no longer signif-
icant. Considering external provided training measures, again we find stronger negative ef-
fects for training measures that are portable (-2.9%) and visible (-0.8%), of which only porta-
bility is significant. Furthermore, in both models with exogenous instruments, neither the AR-
test nor the Hansen-test achieve better results than in our basic model. Therefore, we prefer 
the basic model without exogenous instruments.     
In the WeLL-ADIAB data set, the individual daily wages are censored at the social benefits 
contribution income threshold20. In the case that individuals earn daily wages higher than the 
appropriate income threshold, wage information therefore is not reliable. In order to ensure 
that the retention effect of training is not biased by censored wages, we eliminate those em-
ployees concerned and calculate a robustness check based on the restricted sample.21 By 
doing so, in the basic model we find almost unchanged retention effects of training of 10.5% 
in the OLS estimation, of 11.6% in the Fixed Effects estimation and of 12.8% in the Diff GMM 
                                               
20 For Western Germany, the income threshold corresponds to 170.9€ per day for the year 2005, 
172.6€ for 2006 and 2007, 173.7€ for 2008, 177.5 for 2009, and 180.8 for the year 2010. For Eastern 
Germany, the income threshold is 144.6€ for the years 2005 and 2006, 149.6€ for 2007, 147.5€ for 
2008, 149.6€ for 2009, and 152.9€ for the year 2010. 
21 Only 572 individuals with 1691 observations are affected by the income threshold. This reduces the 
sample to 3,614 individuals 
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model (compare Table 4, models 1-3 with Table A7). Therefore, censored wages should not 
play a decisive role, when analysing the retention effect of training. This can also be seen, 
when we exclude the wage information from the estimation model. In this case, both the re-
tention effect of training as well as the negative effects of portability and visibility of training 
remain quite robust across all methods.  
By using the approach of Leuven & Oosterbeck (2008), we restricted our sample exclusively 
to training participants and accidental training non-participants. As already shown in the de-
scriptive statistics, both groups of this subsample are much more similar than training partici-
pants and typical non-trainees in the original sample. In order to test whether the unobserved 
heterogeneity affects the estimation results, based on the full sample we run an additional 
robustness check of our basic models in Table 4 (compare Table A8). Whereas the positive 
retention effects of training are quite robust in all model specifications, the additional negative 
effects of general and certified training measures are biased. Especially the additional posi-
tive effect of general training contents in the Fixed Effects and in the Diff GMM estimations 
does not make any sense. Moreover, in contrast to all previous results, we only find a signifi-
cant negative effect in the case of external provided certificates. The distortion of the effects 
may be a result of higher unobserved individual heterogeneity in the full sample. Therefore, 
the restriction of the comparison group to accidental training non-participants seems to be a 
good strategy.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to determine the retention effect of training. On the basis of 
large linked employer-employee panel data with detailed information on the employee train-
ing history from Germany, we find that training has a significantly positive retention effect but 
according to human capital theory, portable training reduces the retention effect. According 
to monopsony theory, visibility of training also reduces the retention effect. These negative 
retention effects are much stronger if training is provided and certified by external training 
institutions. The total retention effect even of credible portable and visible training is positive, 
or training providers can increase their chances to keep employees even by offering training 
that increases productivity in other firms and leads to certificates other employers can as-
sess. We also find that controlling for visibility reduces the retention effect of portability only 
minimally – this also applies vice versa. In other words, portability and visibility have a sepa-
rate and distinct impact on retention. 
We are careful to avoid the estimation problems usually encountered when measuring the 
effects of training. First, we compare training participants with accidental training non-
participants – employees who had been chosen to participate in training but had to cancel it 
on the basis of exogeneous reasons. We have spell data for employment and training and 
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therefore can determine exactly which employer offered training. Our measure of retention 
therefore indicates whether the employee stayed at the employer he or she worked for during 
the previous year and whether the training received during this time spell was at this employ-
er. In addition, we account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in fixed effects re-
gressions and for training endogeneity in diff GMM estimations using internal instruments. 
Besides the usual individual and employer characteristics that determine retention, we also 
include wage increases and job satisfaction as important drivers for retention as well as train-
ing participation. 
In a series of robustness checks we show the impact of reducing the sample to incidental 
training non-participants in our reference group, taking into account wage increases, using a 
Probit model instead of an ordinary least square estimation or including external instruments. 
Some papers propose hypotheses for further sub-samples of the data set. Loewenstein and 
Spletzer (1999) and Booth and Bryan (2005) for example argue that invisibility might render 
portable training into non-portable training. Therefore the negative retention effect of portable 
training might only occur if training is visible. Spence (1973) argues that visibility of training 
per se leads to a reduction in retention irrespective of training portability. Visible and credible 
training might for example reveal the motivation to exert effort (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998) 
which increases the labour market value of training participants even if training contents do 
not directly increase productivity in other firms and therefore visibility also decreases reten-
tion for non-portable training contents. Unfortunately, the sample sizes for these training sub-
groups are too small in our data set and therefore we have to leave these questions on the 
heterogeneity of different training measures to future research on the basis of larger data 
sets. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Description of differences between training participants and training non-participants 
Sociodemographic  
Factors 
Total 
Training  
participants 
Training non-
participants 
t-value 
Female  28.52% 29.47% 27.57% -3.06*** 
  
   
 
Birth year  
   
 
≤ 1951 12.09% 10.51% 13.91% -7.43*** 
1952-61 35.52% 35.73% 33.94% 1.62* 
1962-71 30.76% 31.94% 29.45% -3.91*** 
≥ 1972 21.63% 21.83% 19.85% -3.54*** 
  
   
 
Experience  
   
 
< 10 years 20.62% 19.70% 18.40% -2.41** 
10 – 20 years 50.12% 50.46% 50.71% 0.35 
> 20 years  29.27% 29.84% 30.89% 1.66* 
  
   
 
Tenure 
   
 
< 10 years 43.89% 44.19% 42.82% -2.01** 
10 – 20 years 37.52% 38.79% 38.14% -0.96 
> 20 years  18.59% 17.02% 19.04% 3.79*** 
  
   
 
Education 
   
 
No vocational education 6.06% 3.54% 6.85% 10.31*** 
Vocational education 73.41% 69.00% 75.59% 10.56*** 
University degree 20.53% 27.47% 17.56% -17.24*** 
     
Work satisfaction  79.98% 84.14% 77.34% -12.34*** 
  
   
 
Wage increase dummy 34.46% 35.97% 34.49% -2.21** 
Log daily wage 2005 4.52 4.62 4.46 -7.98*** 
Log daily wage 2006 4.57 4.66 4.52 -9.22*** 
Log daily wage 2007 4.54 4.67 4.46 -11.17*** 
Log daily wage 2008 4.52 4.68 4.42 -11.09*** 
     
Training      
Training certificate 75.22% - - - 
External certificate 84.31% - - - 
Training with general content 82.68%    
      
Observations 22,140 8,599 13,541  
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Table A2: Determinants of the wage in the next year (Mincer equation) 
dep. variable: 
log(daily wage) next year 
Full sample  
Restricted sample with 
accidental training non-
participants 
OLS (1) 
 
OLS (2) 
Training 
0.098*** 
(0.005)  
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
Female 
-0.158*** 
(0.005)  
-0.126*** 
(0.008) 
Birth year 1952-1961 
-0.033** 
(0.008)  
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
Birth year 1962-1971 
0.033*** 
(0.08)  
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
Birth year > 1972 
0.005 
(0.011)  
-0.033** 
(0.016) 
tenure < 10 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
 
-0.017 
(0.012) 
tenure 10-20 
0.001 
(0.008) 
 
-0.025** 
(0.012) 
experience < 10 
-0.383*** 
(0.011) 
 
-0.333*** 
(0.016) 
experience 10-20 
-0.250*** 
(0.007) 
 
-0.227*** 
(0.010) 
work satisfaction 
0.024*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
vocational education 
0.121*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.075*** 
(0.017) 
university degree 
0.462*** 
(0.011) 
 
0.386*** 
(0.018) 
year dummies yes 
 
yes 
firm characteristics  yes 
 
yes 
R² 0.347  0.334 
Observations 21,069 
 
8,086 
Dependent variable: log(daily wage) in the next calendar year; reference category for age: birth year ≤ 1951; 
reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20; reference catego-
ry for education: no vocational education; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2005-2010. 
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Table A3: Share of training with general content and with training certificate 
 
 
 
training certificate  
yes no 
 
general 
training 
content 
yes 65.15% 34.85% 100% 
no 78.46% 21.54% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4: Share of external provided training with general content and with external training certificate  
 
 
 
external training certificate  
yes no 
 
general 
training 
content 
yes 79.38% 20.62% 100% 
no 85.64% 14.36% 100% 
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Table A5: Determinants of employee retention IV; marginal effects after Probit 
 Basic Models  
Basic Models with externally  
provided training certificate 
 
Probit (1) 
 
Probit (2) 
training 
0.128*** 
(0.026)  
0.224*** 
(0.062) 
wage increase 
0.019*** 
(0.003)  
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
training * general content 
-0.012** 
(0.005)  
-0.033*** 
(0.010) 
training * certificate 
-0.014*** 
(0.004)  
-0.020*** 
(0.008) 
female 
-0.002 
(0.004)  
0.001 
(0.005) 
birth year 1952-1961 
-0.016* 
(0.009)  
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
birth year 1962-1971 
-0.019** 
(0.009)  
-0.037** 
(0.017) 
birth year > 1972 
-0.027* 
(0.014)  
-0.040* 
(0.002) 
tenure < 10 
-0.031*** 
(0.009)  
-0.046*** 
(0.013) 
tenure 10-20 
-0.009 
(0.008)  
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
experience < 10 
-0.010 
(0.009)  
-0.013 
(0.012) 
experience 10-20 
0.001 
(0.005)  
-0.001 
(0.007) 
work satisfaction 
0.006*** 
(0.001)  
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
vocational education 
-0.001 
(0.008)  
0.017 
(0.013) 
university degree 
-0.002 
(0.009)  
0.014 
(0.010) 
Year dummies yes 
 
yes 
establishment characteristics  yes 
 
yes 
R² 0.180 
 
0.190 
observations 8,086 
 
4,682 
individuals - 
 
- 
AR-test  - 
 
- 
Hansen test - 
 
- 
Dependent variable: retention probability in the next calendar year; reference category for age: birthyear ≤ 1951; 
reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20; reference catego-
ry for education: no vocational education; establishment characteristics: size, sector; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p 
< 0.1; Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006-2010. 
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Table A6: Determinants of employee retention V; Diff GMM with exogenous instruments 
dep. variable:  
retention next year 
Basic Models 
 
Basic Models with externally provided  
training certificate 
OLS (1) FE (2) GMM (3) 
 
OLS (4) FE (5) GMM (6) 
training 
0.105*** 
(0.010) 
0.119*** 
(0.016) 
0.053* 
(0.029)  
0.117*** 
(0.016) 
0.149*** 
(0.026) 
0.090** 
(0.040) 
wage increase 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.011)  
0.040*** 
(0.007) 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
training * general con-
tent 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.014)  
-0.030** 
(0.012) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
training * certificate 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.015)  
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
-0.041** 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
female 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
- - 
 
0.002 
(0.008) 
- - 
birth year 1952-1961 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
- - 
 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
- - 
birth year 1962-1971 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
- - 
 
-0.020* 
(0.012) 
- - 
birth year > 1972 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
- - 
 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
- - 
tenure < 10 
-0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.091*** 
(0.032) 
-0.140 
(0.093)  
-0.041*** 
(0.013) 
0.082* 
(0.046) 
-0.185* 
(0.101) 
tenure 10-20 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.038 
(0.031) 
-0.163 
(0.105)  
-0.012 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.043) 
-0.196** 
(0.097) 
experience < 10 
-0.029** 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
0.028 
(0.063)  
-0.033** 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.050) 
0.062 
(0.079) 
experience 10-20 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.026) 
0.037 
(0.042)  
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.037) 
0.048 
(0.055) 
work satisfaction 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.00) 
-0.005 
(0.012)  
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
vocational education 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
- - 
 
0.016 
(0.018) 
- - 
university degree 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
- - 
 
0.018 
(0.019) 
- - 
year dummies yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
establishment charac-
teristics  
yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
R² 0.069 0.039 - 
 
0.090 0.054 - 
observations 8,086 8,086 1,810 
 
4,682 4,682 1,087 
individuals - 4,186 1,200 
 
- 2,626 790 
AR-test  - - 0.092 
 
- - 0.531 
Hansen test - - 0.265 
 
- - 0.059 
Dependent variable: retention probability in the next calendar year; reference category for age: birthyear ≤ 1951; 
reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20; reference catego-
ry for education: no vocational education; establishment characteristics: size, sector; exogenous instruments: 
expected skill shortages; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006-2010. 
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Table A7: Determinant of employee retention V; without censored wage observations 
dep. variable:  
retention next year 
Basic Models 
 
Basic Models with externally provided  
training certificate 
OLS (1) FE (2) GMM (3) 
 
OLS (4) FE (5) GMM (6) 
training 
0.105*** 
(0.010) 
0.116*** 
(0.018) 
0.128*** 
(0.032)  
0.120*** 
(0.017) 
0.147*** 
(0.029) 
0.155*** 
(0.043) 
wage increase 
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.026** 
(0.011)  
0.042*** 
(0.008) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.036*** 
(0.014) 
training * general con-
tent 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.018)  
-0.025* 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.021) 
-0.015 
(0.018) 
training * certificate 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.014)  
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.032* 
(0.019) 
-0.029 
(0.023) 
female 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
- - 
 
0.001 
(0.008) 
- - 
birth year 1952-1961 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
- - 
 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
- - 
birth year 1962-1971 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
- - 
 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
- - 
birth year > 1972 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
- - 
 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
- - 
tenure < 10 
-0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.081** 
(0.036) 
0.150 
(0.117)  
-0.056*** 
(0.015) 
0.059 
(0.052) 
0.012 
(0.119) 
tenure 10-20 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
0.019 
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.097)  
-0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.027 
(0.048) 
-0.112 
(0.101) 
experience < 10 
-0.032** 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.042) 
-0.048 
(0.085)  
-0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.082 
(0.062) 
0.032 
(0.104) 
experience 10-20 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.006 
(0.059)  
-0.003 
(0.012) 
0.040 
(0.045) 
-0.001 
(0.075) 
work satisfaction 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.008)  
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
vocational education 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
- - 
 
0.018 
(0.020) 
- - 
university degree 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
- - 
 
0.023 
(0.021) 
- - 
year dummies yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
establishment charac-
teristics  
yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
R² 0.076 0.046 - 
 
0.091 0.061 - 
observations 6,395 6,395 2,442 
 
3,619 3,723 1,358 
individuals - 3,614 1,583 
 
- 2,162 958 
AR-test  - - 0.934 
 
- - 0.666 
Hansen test - - 0.125 
 
- - 0.069 
Dependent variable: retention probability in the next calendar year; reference category for age: birthyear ≤ 1951; 
reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20; reference catego-
ry for education: no vocational education; establishment characteristics: size, sector; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p 
< 0.1; Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006-2010. 
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Table A8: Determinants of employee retention VI; full sample  
dep. variable:  
retention next year 
Basic Models 
 
Basic Models with externally  
provided training 
OLS (1) FE (2) GMM (3) 
 
OLS (4) FE (5) GMM (6) 
training 
0.092*** 
(0.010) 
0.076*** 
(0.011) 
0.074*** 
(0.013)  
0.110*** 
(0.017) 
0.102*** 
(0.020) 
0.117*** 
(0.020) 
wage increase 
0.043*** 
(0.004) 
0.037*** 
(0.005) 
0.043*** 
(0.006)  
0.048*** 
(0.005) 
0.042*** 
(0.006) 
0.044*** 
(0.007) 
training * general con-
tent 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.012)  
-0.022 
(0.015) 
0.011 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
training * certificate 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.011)  
-0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.026* 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
female 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
- - 
 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
- - 
birth year 1952-1961 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
- - 
 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
- - 
birth year 1962-1971 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
- - 
 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
- - 
birth year > 1972 
-0.032*** 
(0.010) 
- - 
 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
- - 
tenure < 10 
-0.071*** 
(0.007) 
0.170*** 
(0.020) 
0.314*** 
(0.051)  
-0.082*** 
(0.009) 
0.180*** 
(0.023) 
0.240*** 
(0.048) 
tenure 10-20 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.046** 
(0.018) 
0.008 
(0.037)  
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.034 
(0.021) 
-0.033 
(0.039) 
experience < 10 
-0.058*** 
(0.010) 
-0.065 
(0.025) 
-0.106 
(0.041)  
-0.064*** 
(0.011) 
-0.051* 
(0.030) 
-0.097** 
(0.042) 
experience 10-20 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.023)  
-0.023*** 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.021) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
work satisfaction 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.005)  
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.008 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
vocational education 
0.002 
(0.009) 
- - 
 
0.009 
(0.010) 
- - 
university degree 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
- - 
 
0.003 
(0.011) 
- - 
year  yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
establishment charac-
teristics  
yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
R² 0.095 0.063 - 
 
0.103 0.066 - 
observations 17,177 17,177 11,722 
 
13,958 13,958 8,127 
individuals - 5,941 5,378 
 
- 5,703 4,363 
AR-test  - - 0.067 
 
- - 0.000 
Hansen test - - 0.617 
 
- - 0.046 
Dependent variable: retention probability in the next calendar year; reference category for age: birth year ≤ 1951; 
reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20; reference catego-
ry for education: no vocational education; establishment characteristics: size, sector; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p 
< 0.1; Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006-2010. 
 
